During the last twenty years in Latin America, there has been a rise in governments drawn from self-defining progressive political currents. Consequently a revitalization is underway of the debate on the viability, pertinence, and characteristics of the welfare state in the twenty-first century. In this context, the present article explores emerging social practices that redefine the various senses of the public space; practices that go beyond nation states, situated in a global territoriality, articulating languages and eliciting emotions capable of producing (...) new socialities. The multitude is discussed as a social subject capable of generating transformative practices. Specifically, the article analyzes the way in which the singularities of occupations raise further questions for nation states. The analysis focuses on global movements such as #Occupy camping out on squares. (shrink)

Primitivism about the direction of time is the thesis that the direction of time does not call for an explanation because it is a primitive posit in one’s ontology. In the literature, primitivism has generally come with a substantival view of time according to which time is an independent substance. In this paper, we defend a new primitivist approach to the direction of time—relational primitivism. According to it, time is primitively directed because change is primitive. By relying on Leibnizian relationalism, (...) we argue that a relational ontology of time must be able to distinguish between spatial relations and temporal relations to make sense of the distinction between variation and change. This distinction, however, requires the assumption of a primitive directionality of change, which ushers in the direction of time. Relational primitivism is attractive for those who want to avoid substantivalism about time but retain a primitive direction of time in a more parsimonious ontology. (shrink)

A widespread view in physics holds that the implementation of time reversal in standard quantum mechanics must be given by an anti-unitary operator. In foundations and philosophy of physics, however, there has been some discussion about the conceptual grounds of this orthodoxy, largely relying on either its obviousness or its mathematical-physical virtues. My aim in this paper is to substantively change the traditional structure of the debate by highlighting the philosophical commitments underlying the orthodoxy. I argue that the persuasive force (...) of the orthodoxy can benefit from a relational metaphysics of time and a by-stipulation view on symmetries. Within such philosophical background, I submit, the orthodoxy of time reversal in standard quantum mechanics could find a fertile terrain to lay the groundwork for a more thorough conceptual justification. (shrink)

In this paper, I critically assess two recent proposals for an interpretation-independent understanding of non-relativistic quantum mechanics: the overlap strategy (Fraser & Vickers, 2022 ) and the textbook account (Egg, 2021 ). My argument has three steps. I first argue that they presume a Quinean-Carnapian meta-ontological framework that yields flat, structureless ontologies. Second, such ontologies are unable to solve the problems that quantum ontologists want to solve. Finally, only structured ontologies are capable of solving the problems that quantum ontologists want (...) to solve. But they require some dose of speculation. In the end, I defend the conservative way to do quantum ontology, which is (and must be) speculative and non-neutral. (shrink)

In this article I shall defend, against the conventional understanding of the matter, that two coherent and tenable approaches to time reversal can be suitably introduced in standard quantum mechanics: an “orthodox” approach that demands time reversal to be represented in terms of an anti-unitary and anti-linear time-reversal operator, and a “heterodox” approach that represents time reversal in terms of a unitary, linear time-reversal operator. The rationale shall be that the orthodox approach in quantum theories assumes a relationalist metaphysics of (...) time, according to which time reversal is nothing but motion reversal. But, when one shifts gears and turn to a substantivalist metaphysics of time the heterodox approach to time reversal in quantum mechanics comes up in a more natural way. (shrink)

Symmetry-based inferences have permeated many discussions in philosophy of physics and metaphysics of science. It is claimed that symmetries in our physical theories would allow us to draw metaphysical conclusions about the world, a view that I call ‘symmetry inferentialism’. This paper is critical to this view. I claim that (a) it assumes a philosophically questionable characterization of the relevant validity domain of physical symmetries, and (b) it overlooks a distinction between two opposing ways through which relevant physical symmetries become (...) established. My conclusion is that symmetry inferentialism loses persuasive force when these two points are taken into consideration. (shrink)

The notion of time reversal has caused some recent controversy in philosophy of physics. The debate has mainly put the focus on how the concept of time reversal should be formally implemented across different physical theories and models, as if time reversal were a single, unified concept that physical theories should capture. In this paper, I shift the focus of the debate and defend that the concept of time reversal involves at least three facets, where each of them gives rise (...) to opposing views. In particular, I submit that any account of time reversal presupposes (explicitly or implicitly) modal, metaphysical, and heuristic facets. The comprehension of this multi-faceted nature of time reversal, I conclude, shows that time reversal can be coherently said in many ways, suggesting a disunified concept. (shrink)

It has been argued that measurement-induced collapses in Orthodox Quantum Mechanics generates an intrinsic (or built-in) quantum arrow of time. In this paper, I critically assess this proposal. I begin by distinguishing between an intrinsic and non-intrinsic arrow of time. After presenting the proposal of a collapse-based arrow of time in some detail, I argue, first, that any quantum arrow of time in Orthodox Quantum Mechanics is non-intrinsic since it depends on external information about the measurement context, and second, that (...) it cannot be global, but just local. I complement these arguments by assessing some criticisms and considerations about the implementation of time reversal in contexts wherein measurement-induced collapses work. I conclude that the quantum arrow of time delivered by Orthodox Quantum Mechanics is much weaker than usually thought. (shrink)

Primitivism about the direction of time is the thesis that the direction of time does not call for an explanation because it is a primitive posit in one’s ontology. In the literature, primitivism has generally come with a substantival view of time according to which time is an independent substance. In this paper, we defend a new primitivist approach to the direction of time—relational primitivism. According to it, time is primitively directed because change is primitive. By relying on Leibnizian relationalism, (...) we argue that a relational ontology of time must be able to distinguish between spatial relations and temporal relations to make sense of the distinction between variation and change. This distinction, however, requires the assumption of a primitive directionality of change, which ushers in the direction of time. Relational primitivism is attractive for those who want to avoid substantivalism about time but retain a primitive direction of time in a more parsimonious ontology. (shrink)

The paper makes a novel case to vindicate social sciences as substantially a priori against the mainstream view that rejects apriorism as unscientific. After a brief review of the state of the art and the open options to defend a science that is a priori, we lay out a methodological dualism according to which human action is not accessible to the methods of empirical science but requires a normative stance to identify its subject matter as the expression of intentional action. (...) Against this background, we then bring the apriorism of Mises, Rothbard, and Hoppe together with the normative turn in philosophy established by the Pittsburgh School of Philosophy, resulting in normative apriorism as a firmly established scientific method that is specific to the social sciences. In brief, the strategy thus is to bring in normativity as a characteristic trait of human action in order to show why a science of human action has to be a priori in order to capture its subject. (shrink)

Symmetry fundamentalism claims that symmetries should be taken metaphysically seriously as part of the fundamental ontology. The main aim of this paper is to bring some novel objections against this view. I make two points. The first places symmetry fundamentalism within a broader network of philosophical commitments. I claim that symmetry fundamentalism entails idealization realism which, in turn, entails the reification of further theoretical structures. This might lead to an overloaded ontology as well as open the way to criticisms from (...) metaphysical frameworks that reject such reifications. The second point contrasts symmetry fundamentalism with the now common view that regards symmetries as stipulations guiding empirical research and theory construction. I claim that both views clash each other and cannot be held together. I finish the paper with a more positive prospect that will be developed in future work—symmetry deflationism. (shrink)

Two views on the direction of time can be distinguished—primitivism and non-primitivism. According to the former, time’s direction is an in-built, fundamental property of the physical world. According to the latter, time’s direction is a derivative property of a fundamentally directionless reality. In the literature, non-primitivism has been widely supported since most our fundamental dynamical laws are time-reversal invariant. In this paper, I offer a way out to the primitivist. I argue that we do have good grounds to support a (...) primitive direction of time in the quantum realm. The rationale depends on exploiting the metaphysical and dynamical underdetermination of quantum theories to make a case in favor of primitivism. In particular, primitivism can be grounded in spontaneous collapse theories. The specific sense in which these theories capture a primitive direction of time is that, when the ontology of the theory is seriously taken into account, it does not remain invariant under time reversal. In taking GRW with a matter-density field, I will argue that primitivism about the direction of time can be defended in the quantum case. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the concept of time-reversal invariance in physics suffers from metaphysical underdetermination, that is, that the concept may be understood differently depending on one’s metaphysics about time, laws, and a theory’s basic properties. This metaphysical under-determinacy also affects subsidiary debates in philosophy of physics that rely on the concept of time-reversal invariance, paradigmatically the problem of the arrow of time. I bring up three cases that, I believe, fairly illustrate my point. I conclude, on the (...) one hand, that any formal representation of time reversal should be explicit about the metaphysical assumptions of the concept that it intends to represent; on the other, that philosophical arguments that rely on time reversal to argue against a direction of time require additional premises. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to argue that a temporal asymmetry may be established within the framework of quantum field theory, independently of any violation of CP, and thereby T, in weak interactions, and independently of the property of time reversal invariance that its dynamical equations instantiate. Particularly, I shall argue that the temporal asymmetry can be stemmed from assessing the links between the proper group of symmetries of the theory and the ontology of the theory: arguments applied to (...) establish which elements and magnitudes remain invariants under group transformations can also be used to establish a temporal asymmetry. (shrink)

El presente artículo busca ofrecer un análisis conceptual de la noción de información, a partir del modo en que es definida por las teorías formales de Claude Shannon y de Benjamin Schumacher. Contra la postura según la cual existen dos tipos de información de naturalezas diferentes, una información clásica y una información cuántica, aquí argumentamos que no hay razones suficientes para sostener la existencia de la información cuántica como un nuevo tipo sustancialmente distinto de información. Afirmamos así que existe un (...) único tipo de información que puede ser codificado de diversas maneras, en particular, mediante sistemas clásicos o sistemas cuánticos. Esta posición nos conducirá a concebir un concepto unificado y abstracto de información, en un contexto donde la teoría de Shannon resulta neutral e independiente de las teorías físicas utilizadas para describir las partes involucradas en el proceso de transmitir información, y la teoría de Schumacher no define un nuevo tipo de entidad informacional, sino una manera alternativa de codificar la información mediante estados cuánticos. The aim of this article is to offer a conceptual analysis of the notion of information, on the basis of the way in which it is defined by the theories of Claude Shannon and of Benjamin Schumacher. Against the position according to which there are two kinds of information of different natures, a classical information and a quantum information, here we argue that there are not sufficient reasons to maintain the existence of quantum information as a new and substantially different kind of information. So we claim that there is only one kind of information, which can be encoded in different ways, in particular, by means of classical or quantum systems. This position will lead us to conceive an unified and abstract concept of information in a context where Shannon's theory is neutral and independent from the physical theories used to describe the stages involved in the process of transmitting information, and Schumacher's theory does not define a new kind of informational entity, but a alternative way of coding information by means of quantum states. (shrink)

In the philosophy of physics and philosophy of time there is a widely-extended thesis according to which our experience of the passage of time is unreal to the extent that it has no objective grounds in nature as described by our best physical theories. Particularly, as dynamical laws belonging to such theories are temporally symmetric, and they do not distinguish both time directions, the experienced temporal asymmetry turnouts to be illusory. In this paper, I shall argue that we have sound (...) reasons to cast doubts on such thesis. For the one thing, it is not so clear to me to what extent we really have experience of the passage of time. For another thing, it is highly questionable that our dynamical laws are temporally symmetric, and if so, that they were useful to argue against our assumed experience of the passage of time. (shrink)

Harrigan and Spekkens provided a categorization of quantum ontological models classifying them as \-ontic or \-epistemic if the quantum state \ describes respectively either a physical reality or mere observers’ knowledge. Moreover, they claimed that Einstein—who was a supporter of the statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics—endorsed an epistemic view of \ In this essay we critically assess such a classification and some of its consequences by proposing a twofold argumentation. Firstly, we show that Harrigan and Spekkens’ categorization implicitly assumes that (...) a complete description of a quantum system ) only concerns single, individual systems instantiating absolute, intrinsic properties. Secondly, we argue that such assumptions conflict with some current interpretations of quantum mechanics, which employ different ontic states as a complete description of quantum systems. In particular, we will show that, since in the statistical interpretation ontic states describe ensembles rather than individuals, such a view cannot be considered \-epistemic. As a consequence, the authors misinterpreted Einstein’s view concerning the nature of the quantum state. Next, we will focus on relational quantum mechanics and perspectival quantum mechanics, which in virtue of their relational and perspectival metaphysics employ ontic states \ dealing with relational properties. We conclude that Harrigan and Spekkens’ categorization is too narrow and entails an inadequate classification of the mentioned interpretations of quantum theory. Hence, any satisfactory classification of quantum ontological models ought to take into account the variations of \ across different interpretations of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Christopher Timpson proposes a deflationary view about information, according to which the term ‘information’ is an abstract noun and, as a consequence, information is not part of the material contents of the world. The main purpose of the present article consists in supplying a critical analysis of this proposal, which will lead us to conclude that information is an item even more abstract than what Timpson claims. From this view, we embrace a pluralist stance that recognizes the legitimacy of different (...) interpretations of the concept of information. (shrink)

In this paper, we put forward an alternative interpretation of time-reversal symmetry in philosophy of physics: Humean time-reversal symmetry. According to it, time-reversal symmetry is understood as a heuristic, epistemic virtue of the best system, not as a property of the Humean mosaic. One of the consequences of this view is that one of the main arguments against a primitive direction of time is rendered harmless, which paves the way for primitivism about the direction of time.

The aim of this paper is to apply the methodology of minimal ontological commitments to moral and political philosophy. As minimal metaphysics in the philosophy of science endorses scientific realism, so we subscribe to moral realism, arguing that the presumption of liberty is the fundamental assumption defining a person. What needs to be justified then are restrictions to liberty and, in particular, the application of coercion upon persons. In examining knowledge claims about normative facts going beyond the presumption of liberty, (...) such as, for instance, facts about a common good, we show that an ontological commitment to such normative facts is at odds with minimal metaphysics. We thus show how minimal metaphysics vindicates a Kantian deontological stance in moral and political philosophy: moral realism is limited to the obligations that follow from extending the presumption of liberty to all human beings in virtue of them being rational animals, hence to respect every person as an end in itself. (shrink)

There is a widely extended viewpoint about physical possibility, what we will call Standard Approach, which holds that the physically possible is delimited by the nomological structure of physical theories: to be physically possible is to be in accordance with the physical laws, to be physically impossible is to be prohibited by physical laws and to be physically necessary is to be demanded by the physical laws. However, it is possible to show that this approach is too relaxed and permissive (...) when it comes to collecting and systematizing many of the modal intuitions present in the physical community. In this work we will argue, on the one hand, that the notion of physical possibility is more complex and richer than suggested by the standard approach and, on the other hand, that it is necessary to add some extra elements to the characterization of physical possibility in order to that it is adequate in scientific contexts. (shrink)

Nuestro objetivo es examinar por qué la confianza puede ser considerada como una emoción secundaria y cómo ésta se aborda de diferente manera en un contexto estético u ordinario, lo cual proporciona otro modo de investigar las emociones secundarias_. _Nuestra tesis se desarrolla en tres secciones y una conclusión. En la primera sección, hemos desarrollado ejemplos y hecho observaciones a modo de análisis para probar por qué las narrativas son importantes para nuestras emociones secundarias. En la segunda sección, hemos examinado (...) por qué la confianza puede ser considerara como una emoción secundaria así como establecer un criterio para identificarla como tal_. _En la tercera sección, presentamos una de las funciones de la confianza, el intercambio de conocimiento entre agentes, cuando se comparte conocimiento en un proceso epistémico con otros. Hemos comprobado que la construcción de la relación entre sujetos y objetos se produce mayoritariamente gracias a la confianza. Una emoción secundaria que representa lazos afectivos entre sujetos para acceder a una emoción primaria. (shrink)

The aim of the present paper is to supply an elucidation of the concept of information in the communicational context. For this purpose, two traditional interpretations of the concept of information, the epistemic and the physical interpretations, will be distinguished, and their specific problems will be considered. In particular, whereas the epistemic interpretation misses an essential feature of communication, the physical interpretation faces difficulties in the quantum domain. The final goal will be to argue that the difficulties of the physical (...) interpretation can be overcome by means of a manipulability conception of causation. (shrink)

In this work we will deal only with the concept of information in the communicational context, in which information is primarily something that has to be transmitted for communication purposes. The aim of the paper is to consider some arguments traditionally put forward to support the idea that quantum information is qualitatively different than classical information. On the basis of the analysis of those arguments, we will conclude that there are no reasons to admit the existence of quantum information as (...) qualitatively different from classical information: there is only one kind of information, physically neutral, which can be encoded by means of classical or of quantum states. (shrink)

Timpson’s deflationary view of information is an innovative and well articulated view that had a great impact on the philosophy of physics community. However, recently some of the arguments supporting the deflationist view have been critically reviewed. The aim of this paper is to retain the general idea behind Timpson’s proposal, but replacing the conflictive elements used to support his thesis with new argumentative resources based on the notion of manipulability.

Scientific pluralism has gained supporters in philosophy of science during the last decades, since it seems to accurately account for the plural and varied development of science. Arguments in defense of robust, non-merely epistemic pluralistic positions can be found in several contemporary philosophical works. According to these positions, to hold pluralism does not suppose to assume an epistemic position regarding truth and a non-realistic view on scientific theories. Monism can be thought as the “natural” opponent of scientific pluralism. In this (...) paper, we will evaluate the alleged rivalry between the two positions, paying special attention to those riskier, ontologically more robust, pluralistic proposals. We will argue that these strongest versions of pluralism fail to offer an alternative to monism: they either changes the topic or hold a weak skepticism that Hegel develops in the Phenomenology of the Spirit. (shrink)

The moral value of Religion could be doubtful from an utilitarian evaluative standpoint. J. S. Mill analysis about that question in Utility of Religion is well-known.However Hume's similar study in his Enquiry Concerning the Principies of Morals is not known in the same degree. There Hume writes that we consider something a virtue when (1) it is useful to others; (2) it is useful to the subject himself; (3) it is immediately agreeable to others; or ( 4) it is immediately (...) agreeable to the person himself. But, if everything which is useful or agreeable must be considered a virtue, onthe contrary everything useless or disagreeable must be a vice. That is the case with Cristian, monkish, or religious virtues, or «vices»?, in general terms. (shrink)

La desigualdad entre ricos y pobres no decrece. Frente a esta realidad, el autor realza que detrás de la desigualdad hay un problema más hondo de falta de libertad, pues: “hay muchas cosas que los hombres, si llevan la capa remendada, no se atreven a decir”. Por ello –señala- el republicanismo democrático, de Jefferson a Robespierre, y de Rousseau a Marx, no ha dejado de plantear la necesidad de repolitizar la vida social, e incluir en la agenda política los graves (...) problemas de dominación que sufren los más desfavorecidos. Este propósito tendría un camino eficaz seg{un el autor a través de la creación de mecanismos institucionales que doten de seguridad material y económica a toda la ciudadanía, haciendo reales las libertades formales y que permita a los individuos hacer frente eficazmente a situaciones de dominación. Uno de esos mecanismos institucionales es la Renta Básica, propuesta sobre desarrollada por el autor en el presente artículo. (shrink)

RESUMEN El trabajo aborda una faceta dentro del humanismo martiano que refleja sus consideraciones en su bregar por tierras de América. Sus postulados constituyen un imprescindible legado para formar en los estudiantes universitarios valores éticos que los conviertan en mejores seres, humanos y profesionales. En su recorrido desde México hacia Guatemala, el Apóstol pretende resaltar la figura del negro de raza pura que allí vivía. Estas consideraciones se ofrecen a partir del texto Livingstone. El artículo tiene como objetivo develar algunas (...) ideas que permitan un desarrollo político-ideológico, ético y estético integral donde se destaque el conocimiento y respeto por la historia, la autoctonía de los pueblos americanos y la cultura patrias. ABSTRACT The work addresses a facet within Martian humanism that reflects its considerations in its struggle for the lands of America. Its postulates constitute an essential legacy to form in university students ethical values ​​that turn them into better beings, human beings and professionals. On his journey from Mexico to Guatemala, the Apostle pretends to highlight the figure of the black of pure race that lived there. These considerations are offered from the Livingstone text. The article aims to reveal some ideas that allow a political-ideological, ethical and integral aesthetic development where knowledge and respect for history, the autochthony of the American people and the patriotic culture are highlighted. (shrink)

The present paper gives a topological solution to representability problems related to multi-utility, in the field of Decision Theory. Necessary and sufficient topologies for the existence of a semicontinuous and finite Richter–Peleg multi-utility for a preorder are studied. It is well known that, given a preorder on a topological space, if there is a lower semicontinuous Richter–Peleg multi-utility, then the topology of the space must be finer than the Upper topology. However, this condition fails to be sufficient. Instead of search (...) for properties that must be satisfied by the preorder, we study finer topologies which are necessary or/and sufficient for the existence of semicontinuous representations. We prove that Scott topology must be contained in the topology of the space in case there exists a finite lower semicontinuous Richter–Peleg multi-utility. However, the existence of this representation cannot be guaranteed. A sufficient condition is given by means of Alexandroff’s topology, for that, we prove that more order implies less Alexandroff’s topology, as well as the converse. Finally, the paper is implemented with a topological study of the maximal elements. (shrink)

Este trabajo fue pensado a modo de homenaje a Antoni Domènech, quien nos legó un Programa de Investigación sobre “las raíces históricas y conceptuales del republicanismo democrático clásico”, también valedero para el momento actual del modo de producir capitalista en el que nos encontramos al inicio de la tercera década del siglo XXI. Nos ocuparemos i) de fundamentar y mostrar la viabilidad de una Renta Básica, entendida como resguardo de un mínimum de existencia social para todos, que permitiría garantizar una (...) universalización de la libertad republicana; y también ii) abordaremos el tema de la justificación de una Renta Máxima, entendiendo que la acumulación de riqueza y, por ello mismo, de poder económico y político de los muy ricos, atenta contra el deber fiduciario de las repúblicas democráticas de garantizar una “vida normal” para todos sus habitantes. This article is envisaged as a homage to Antoni Domènech who bequeathed us a Research Programme on “the historical and conceptual origins of classical democratic republicanism”, which is also valid for the phase of the capitalist mode of production we are presently facing at the beginning of the third decade of the twenty-first century. Our aims are 1) to establish and demonstrate the viability of a basic income, which is understood as safeguarding a minimum of social existence for everyone, and that would guarantee the universalisation of republican freedom; and 2) to tackle the question of justifying a Maximum Income, in the understanding that the accumulation of wealth, and hence of the political and economic power of the very rich, is an assault against the fiduciary duty of democratic republics to guarantee a “normal” life for all citizens. (shrink)

The World Health Organization has declared a world pandemic due to COVID-19. In response, most affected countries have enacted measures involving compulsory confinement and restrictions on free movement, which likely influence citizens' lifestyles. This study investigates changes in health risk behaviors with duration of confinement. An online cross-sectional survey served to collect data about the Spanish adult population regarding health behaviors during the first 3 weeks of confinement. A large sample of participants from all Spanish regions completed the survey. Binomial (...) logistic regressions adjusted for socioeconomic characteristics, body mass index, previous HRBs, and confinement context were conducted to investigate associations between the number of weeks confined and a set of six HRBs. When adjusted, we observed significantly lower odds of experiencing a higher number of HRBs than before confinement overall in a time-dependent fashion: OR 0.63; 95% CI: 0.49–0.81 for the second and OR 0.47; 95% CI: 0.36–0.61 for the third week of confinement. These results were equally consistent in all age and gender subgroup analyses. The present study indicates that changes toward a higher number of HRBs than before confinement, as well as the prevalence of each HRB except screen exposure, decreased during the first 3 weeks of COVID-19 confinement, and thus the Spanish adult population may have adapted to the new situational context by gradually improving their health behaviors. (shrink)

Food democracy is a concept with growing influence in food research. Food democracy deals with how actors may regain democratic control over the food system enabling its sustainable transformation. Following multi-level perspective framework's connotations, food democracy research has so far mainly focused on the niche level of the food system. An integrative approach that includes the perspectives of both the regime and the niche is still missing. This study addresses this research gap and proposes a new conceptual framework for food (...) democracy that includes actors from the niche and the regime level. Furthermore, we apply our conceptual framework to the urban food system of Vienna to explore the deeper meaning and practice of food democracy. Finally, we have conducted semi-structured interviews with actors at niche level and regime level within Vienna’s urban food system. Findings from this research broaden the perspective on food democracy and illustrate actors’ contributions at niche and regime level such as promoting organic food, re-localizing food provision, and procuring environmentally sustainable public food. Barriers to food democracy were also identified, e.g.: actors’ self-enhancement values, market-orientation, and capitalist alignment or lack of transparency. We conclude that actors at the niche and, to some extent, at the regime level may contribute to a process of on-going changes that fosters a transformation of established structures within the food system. (shrink)

Reponse to Peter Milne (2005)'s argument agaist maximalism about truthmaking.

From its very beginning, sociological thought has been concerned with a topic central to our daily lives: social distance. Since inception, the concept of social distance has referred to the relationships of familiarity and strangeness between social groups, which is experienced in the social world in terms of “We” and “They”. This article covers the main tenets of a Schutzian phenomenological approach to the study of social distance and group relationships. Specific focus is placed on the different attitudes and valuations (...) of the in-group towards the out-group considered as a stranger, the invisible excess of meaning that emerges in these types of social relationships and the conceptual construction of the Other that explains the phenomenon of discrimination. (shrink)

En este artículo expongo y analizo la propuesta berkeleyana del conocimiento nocional, que representa entre otras cosas el intento del irlandés por conocer a la mente o espíritu, esto es, a aquella cosa pensante y activa que por su propia actividad resulta irrepresentable como idea. Como el conocimiento nocional ya se menciona en los Comentarios Filosófi cos me remitiré a ellos para conocer los orígenes del mismo; sin embargo, como tal conocimiento aparece con mayor detalle en obras posteriores me serviré (...) sobre todo del Tratado para abordar la compleja doctrina nocional. // In this paper I expose and analyze the berkeleian proposal of notional knowledge. Among other things, this proposal represents Berkeley ́s attempt to know the mind or spirit, that is, the thinking and active thing that by its own activity results unrepresentable as idea. As such knowledge is already mentioned in the Philosophical Commentaries, I will refer to them in order to know the origins of that proposal. However, as notional knowledge appears in more detail in later works, I will make use especially of the Treatise to address the complex notional doctrine. (shrink)